Economic Growth in Colombia: a Reversal of Fortune"?" by Mauricio Cárdenas
Economic Growth in Colombia: 
a Reversal of “Fortune”? 
 
WORKING PAPERS SERIES - DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 
February de 2007 - No. 36 
 
Mauricio Cárdenas S.   2 
Version for publication (ESPE) 





















Since 1979, Colombia’s annual GDP growth has been on average two percentage points 
lower  than  what  was  observed  between  1950  and  1980.  The  sources-of-growth 
decomposition  shows  that  this  deceleration  can  be  accounted  entirely  by  changes  in 
productivity.  Indeed,  between  1960  and  1980  productivity  gains  increased  output  per 
worker by nearly 1% per year. Since 1980, productivity losses have reduced output per 
worker at about the same rate. The time series analysis suggests that the implosion of 
productivity was caused by the increase in criminality which diverted capital and labor to 
unproductive activities. In turn, the rise in crime was the result of rapid expansion in 
drug-trafficking  activities,  which  erupted  around  1980.  Consequently,  the  fortunes 
associated with the emergence of Colombia as the world largest producer of cocaine had 
a significantly negative effect on growth and productivity. This explanation is supported 
by cross-country evidence that shows that Colombia’s underperformance, especially in 
the 1990s, is explained by its high homicide rate.  
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Desde 1979, el crecimiento anual del PIB en Colombia ha estado en promedio dos puntos 
porcentuales por debajo del crecimiento observado entre 1950 y 1980. Las fuentes de 
descomposición  del  crecimiento  revelan  que  esta  desaceleración  está  explicada  por 
cambios en la productividad. En efecto, entre 1960 y 1980 las ganancias en productividad 
aumentaron el producto por trabajador en casi un punto porcentual por año. Desde 1980, 
las pérdidas de productividad han reducido el producto por trabajador a una tasa similar.  
El análisis de series de tiempo sugiere que la contracción de productividad fue causada 
por un aumento en la criminalidad, la cual desvió el capital y la mano de obra hacia 
actividades  improductivas.  Las  mayores  tasas  de  criminalidad  fueron  resultado  de  la 
rápida expansión del tráfico de drogas, cuyo punto de partida se puede situar alrededor de 
1980. De tal manera, la riqueza asociada con el surgimiento de Colombia como el más 
grande  productor  de  cocaína  tuvo  un  efecto  negativo  sobre  el  crecimiento  y  la 
productividad. Esta explicación se encuentra apoyada por comparaciones entre países, las 
cuales revelan que el bajo crecimiento  de Colombia, especialmente en la década de los 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Colombia has traditionally been regarded as a success story in terms of economic growth 
and stability. According to Figure 1a, this reputation is based on the macroeconomic 
performance between the 1930s and 1970s, which was characterized by increasing GDP 
growth rates combined with a reduction in volatility (measured by the standard deviation 
in growth rates). In fact, GDP growth rose to an annual average of 5.8% during the 1970s 
from 3.8% during the 1930s. The standard deviation in the growth rate fell from around 
3% during the 1930s and 1940s to 1% during the 1960s (and then rose to 1.7% during the 
1970s in spite of much sharper external shocks relative to previous decades). 
 
As shown in Figure 1b, per capita GDP growth rates show similar trends. In this case, the 
acceleration  in  growth  was  particularly  significant  during  the  1960s  and  1970s.  The 
economics  profession,  both  nationally  and  internationally,  impressed  with  this 
performance,  considered  Colombia  as  a  paradigm  of  macroeconomic  management, 
praising the combination of able technocrats and sound institutions as the key driving 
elements of this success story.  
 
As in every other Latin American country, growth decelerated significantly during the 
1980s. Figures 1a and 1b show that very clearly: average GDP growth fell to 3.4% per 
year, while the annual per-capita GDP growth was 1.2% (nearly two percentage points 
below the rate observed in the previous decade). This was, of course, Latin America’s 
“lost decade” when GDP contractions were the norm in the region. In fact, at that time 
Colombia was seen as an over-performer mainly because it did not default on its debt and 
did not experience negative economic growth, contrary to was observed in many other 
Latin  American  countries.  However,  during  the  1990s  Colombia’s  economic  growth 
decelerated even further -to an average per capita growth rate of 0.9% per year. This was 
a surprising result for two reasons. First, almost every other country in the region (with 
the exception of Paraguay) had higher growth during the 1990s relative to the 1980s. 
Second, Colombia adopted a package of reforms in the early 1990s with the explicit goal 
of accelerating growth.  
 
This paper deals with several issues related with this reversal in economic fortune. It 
starts  by  analyzing  the  time  series  evidence  in  order  to  test  for  structural  breaks  in 
Colombia’s postwar economic growth data. The evidence, which is robust to various 
specifications and methodologies, indicates that a downbreak in growth rates occurred in 
1979. Furthermore, using standard growth decomposition exercises, the paper shows that 
the reduction in economic growth can be explained by the reduction in productivity, 
rather than a deceleration in the rate of accumulation of physical and human capital.  
 
In searching for more fundamental determinants, the paper finds that the unexpected (and 
quantitatively large) increases in crime rates (measured by homicides and kidnappings) 
were the driving force behind the deceleration in growth. In turn, higher crime rates have 
been the result of the expansion of drug-trafficking activities, which took off during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. In other words, although initially perceived as favorable to   5 
the economy, the sudden increase in illicit exports did in fact become a curse, causing a 
major reversal in terms of growth performance. 
 
This explanation differs from the more traditional views on recent growth performance in 
Colombia, based on the role of external shocks, fiscal management, and the consequences 
of a comprehensive structural reform package introduced in the early 1990s. In fact, most 
explanations have highlighted the role of the debt crisis in the 1980s, the growing fiscal 
deficit  during  the  1990s,  and  the  adoption  of  the  ‘Washington  Consensus’  package 
(especially trade liberalization and central bank independence) during the 1990s. In the 
case of the latter, some analyses argue that the adoption of the package was the cause of 
low growth, while others consider that low growth has been the result of the lack of 
additional reforms that are necessary for the package to deliver better results
3.  
 
This paper searches for an alternative explanation framed in the context of the recent 
growth literature and the cross-national evidence. After analyzing the underlying factors 
that explain economic growth in Colombia it concludes that the ‘fortunes’ generated by 
drug-trafficking –which exacerbated crime and violence- explain the change in economic 
performance in Colombia since 1980. 
 
In other words, the paper identifies a fortuitous event that interacted with some initial 
conditions –high levels of inequality and poverty and the weak presence of the State in 
certain areas of the country- that was able to alter the growth trajectory for over two 
decades. In addition, the initial shock induced further changes in the institutions and 
policies, leading to the vicious circle of low growth and high crime. More concretely, the 
sudden  increase  in  drug-trafficking  set  in  motion  a  chain  reaction  which  not  only 
exacerbated crime and conflict (with a consequent negative impact on productivity) but 
possibly  also  had  an  adverse  effect  on  the  ability  to  conduct  more  prudent 
macroeconomic  policies.  The  increase  in  government  expenditures  and  the  resulting 
fiscal deficit were, to some extent, the result of the conflict itself
4. 
 
The analytical narrative is carried out at three different levels. First, using the standard 
sources-of-growth  accounting,  the  paper  presents  new  evidence  on  the  ‘proximate’ 
determinants of growth: (a) physical capital deepening; (b) human capital accumulation; 
and  (c)  productivity  growth.  As  is  well  known,  this  decomposition  has  limitations 
because  accumulation  and  productivity  are  endogenous  factors.  In  spite  of  the 
shortcomings, the decomposition shows that most of the ‘explanation’ of the reversal of 
growth in Colombia can be attributed to total factor productivity. However, this does not 
provide a structural interpretation of what caused the growth deceleration in Colombia. 
 
Second, the paper analyzes the ‘deep’ or ‘fundamental’ determinants of growth. Recent 
growth  studies  have  focused  on  the  role  of  physical  geography  and  institutions  in 
                                                 
3 Ocampo (2004) argues that the sequencing and speed of structural reforms was not helpful to growth. At 
the other end, Edwards and Steiner (2000) underscore the lack of comprehensiveness in Colombia’s reform 
package. 
4 Additional expenditures to preserve the rule of law (e.g. defense and justice) are one example of the links 
between conflict and fiscal outcomes.   6 
determining  the  long–run  performance  of  nations.  This  paper  argues  that  it  was  an 
interesting interaction between these two forces that led to lower growth. Colombia has 
the ideal geographical location and the ecological systems for the development of the 
illicit drug business. In turn, these activities deteriorated institutional quality (e.g., the 
protection of property rights) with a negative effect on economic outcomes.  
 
The paper is divided in five additional sections. Section 2 deals with the time series 
evidence and applies a simple procedure in order to identify a structural downbreak in 
Colombia’s GDP growth since 1979. Section 3 presents the standard sources-of-growth 
decomposition in order to quantify the role of physical and human capital accumulation, 
as well as technological change in per-worker GDP growth. The evidence indicates that 
productivity is the key driving force behind the reduction in growth since 1979. Using 
time series data, Section 4 shows that the higher levels of crime and violence were the 
cause of the productivity implosion during the 1980s and 1990s. Section 5 looks into this 
issue using some cross-country regressions. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. GROWTH REVERSAL: TIME SERIES FACTS 
 
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  identify  structural  breaks  in  Colombia’s  postwar 
economic growth. We follow closely  the empirical strategy of Berg et al. (2006) and 
apply the two-step procedure proposed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a) aimed at testing 
for multiple structural breaks in a single time series, when both the total number and the 
potential location of those breaks are unknown. In the first step, the procedure identifies 
all possible breaks and estimates  their statistical significance using F tests. If  there is 
evidence of at least one structural break, the procedure then selects the optimal number of 
breaks using information criteria, such as the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) or the 
modified Schwartz criterion (LWZ). Alternatively to information criteria, Bai and Perron 
(2003a) suggest to use a sequential F statistic, which tests the null hypothesis of 0 breaks 
against 1 break; if the null is rejected, then a new break is added and the test is performed 
again, testing the null of 1 break versus 2 breaks, and so on. 
 
In empirical work, an important issue is concerned with the selection of the minimum 
number of years between breaks  h (known as the “interstitiary period”). This decision 
involves a trade-off because choosing a long interstitiary period (say  10 h =  years) means 
that the procedure can miss some true breaks that are less than 10 years apart. But, on the 
other hand, a short interstitiary period implies the use of very small subsamples with as 
few as  2 1 h+  observations. A shorter sample lowers the power of the test (i.e. the null 
hypothesis of no structural break is not rejected when it should be rejected).  
 
We use annual GDP growth data between 1951 and 2005, so the total sample size (T ) 
equal to 55 observations. Additionally, we impose a relatively long interstitiary period, 
13 h = , to minimize the problem of small subsamples. Thus, the maximum number of 
breaks allowed by the procedure, m , where  [ ] int / 1 m T h =   , is equal to 3.    7 
 
Table 1 and Figure 2 summarize the results which robustly support the presence of a 
downbreak in 1979
5. According to the estimates, GDP growth fell to 3.2% between 1980 
and 2005, from 5.2% between 1951 and 1979. This is a significant alteration in growth 
path: while output doubled every 13 years before 1979, it has taken 22 years after then. 
How is that change explained? What caused such a large reduction in growth? These are 
the questions to which we now turn.  
 
 
3. PROXIMATE CAUSES OF GROWTH: ACCUMULATION AND PRODUCTIVITY 
 
This section closely follows the framework developed in Hall and Jones (1999) in order 
to estimate the contribution to growth of changes in the capital-output ratio, changes in 
the  educational  attainment  of  the  population,  and  changes  in  productivity.  Using  the 
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where  Kt  denotes  the  stock  of  physical  capital,  Ht  is  the  amount  of  human  capital-
augmented  labor  used  in  production,  and  At  is  the  labor-augmenting  measure  of 
productivity.  Assume  that  each  unit  of  labor  (Lt)  has  been  trained  with  Et  years  of 
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According to this specification, the function φ(E) reflects the efficiency of a unit of labor 
with E years of schooling relative to one with no schooling (φ(0) = 0). The derivative 
φ’(E)  measures  the  effect  on  efficiency  of  an  additional  year  of  schooling,  which 
corresponds to the return to schooling estimated in a Mincerian wage regression.   
 











     
   
 
 




                                                 
5 The dates and number of breaks remained constant for shorter interstitiary periods. In addition, we applied 









Where y is the log of GDP, µ is a constant, Dt is a dummy variable that takes a unitary value if t > TB, 
where TB is an arbitrary break in the sample. The coefficient θ captures the effect of structural changes in 
economic growth. Using all the possible values for TB we test the null hypothesis of no structural change in 
growth (θ = 0) and compare the t-statistic of all the estimated values of θ (using k=4 based on the Akaike 
information criterion). The structural change corresponding to TB = 1979 has the maximum t-statistic.   8 
 
where ht is human capital per worker. Taking logs and first-differences: 
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This  equation  allows  us  to  decompose  growth  in  output  per  worker  into  changes  in 
physical capital intensity, growth in human capital per worker (educational attainment), 
and growth in productivity (the residual). Note that writing the decomposition in terms of 
the  capital-output  ratio  rather  than  the  capital-labor  ratio  facilitates  the  interpretation 
because the former is proportional to the investment rate (along a balanced growth path)
6.  
 
To  proceed  with  the  decomposition  we  use  data  on  output  (GDP),  labor  input 
(employment), average educational attainment, and physical capital for the 1950-2005 
period. Figure 3 shows the average years of schooling of the urban and rural population 
based on the population censuses and the household surveys
7. It is interesting to note that 
the educational attainment has been increasing at a stable rate since the early 1970s. Even 
though faster progress on this front was made between 1965 and 1973, this is not a likely 
factor in explaining the origin of the growth reversal.  
 
Returns to schooling are a key input in order to construct the function φ(E). Núñez and 
Sánchez (2000) estimate a Mincer equation and provide this information. According to 
their results, which are based on the quarterly household surveys for the period 1976-
1998, the rates of return to education in Colombia do not have the standard concavity that 
has been obtained for other countries (see Table 2). In fact, the returns to education per 
year of education (for individuals with 11 years of schooling) are 10 percent for men and 
16  percent  for  women.  These  levels  are  about  the  same  as  the  ones  observed  for 
individuals with five years of schooling, corresponding to primary education. Workers 
with completed higher education have the highest returns to education (21.5 percent). For 
comparison, Figure 4 includes a measure of φ(E) based on the more standard concave 




The  stock  of  capital  was  constructed  using  the  perpetual  inventory  model  on 
disaggregated  investment  data  since  1925.  For  the  year  2005,  the  stock  of  capital 
corresponds to the sum of all investment since 1925, net of depreciation
9. Although the 
methodology underestimates the stock of capital for earlier dates, the capital stock is only 
used for the 1955-2005 period (due to the limitations with data on years of schooling 
                                                 
6 It is also interesting to note that GDP per worker (compared to GDP per capita) is a better measure of 
welfare when nonmarket production is important. 
7 The source is (Estadísticas Históricas de Colombia, Cuadro 7.3 (1954-1996)) and calculations from DNP-
DDS for the period 1997-2005. 
8 According to this source, the rate of return (per year of education) for the first four years of education is 
13.4%, for the next four years it falls to 10.1%, and to 6.8% for education beyond the 8
th year. The main 
results of this paper do not change when these alternative returns to schooling are used. 
9 We use a 8% depreciation rate for machinery and furniture, 20% for transportation equipment, and 2% for 
housing and construction. The weighted average rate of depreciation is 4.9%.   9 
prior to 1955). Thus, in practice at least 30 years of investment data are considered for 
each observation of the stock of capital.  
 
Before showing the results of the decomposition it is useful to take a cursory look at the 
raw data. Figure 5 plots output per worker against the capital/output ratio for the period 
1955-2005 (in logs). Interestingly, there seems to be a regime change in 1979. The pre-
1979 period is characterized by an increase in output per worker and a decrease in the 
capital/output ratio, suggesting that productivity played a role in explaining the increase 
in output per worker. In contrast, between 1979 and 1999, increases in the capital/output 
ratio were proportionally larger than increases in output per worker. This can be taken as 
evidence that the accumulation of physical capital is not likely to be the cause of the 
deceleration in growth since 1979.  
 
This  is  indeed  what  the  decomposition  shows.  Table  3  presents  the  results  of  the 
decomposition exercise using the returns to education derived from Núñez and Sánchez 
(2000) and an estimated capital share (α) between 0.2 and 0.4 (we report the results 
corresponding to 0.3)
10. The results show that annual growth in output per worker fell to 
0.8% between 1980 and 2005, from 1.6% between 1955 and 1979. Figure 6 shows the 
estimated total factor productivity
11.  
 
The decomposition indicates that the reduction in output growth cannot be explained by 
changes in physical and human capital intensity. In fact, physical capital intensity (i.e. in 
the capital/output ratio) was a positive source of growth between 1979 and 2005 (adding 
on average 0.5 percentage points to the growth rate per year). The same is true for human 
capital per worker, which was a steady source of growth in output per worker. Indeed, 
during the post-1979 this factor alone would have accounted for an annual growth in 
output per worker of 0.9%. This means that, between 1979 and 2005, the educational 
advancement  of  the  population  and  the  greater  physical  capital  intensity  would  have 
resulted in a 1.4 percent growth rate in output per worker, no too different from what was 
observed before 1979. If anything, physical and human capital alone would have resulted 
in higher output growth in the post-1979 period, relative to the pre-1979 results.  
 
This leaves the residual (i.e. productivity) as the key ‘explanation’ of the low growth 
outcomes. In terms of the accounting, productivity added 1 percentage point in output 
growth  per  year  up  until  1979.  Between  1979 and  2005  it  subtracted  0.6  percentage 
points  in  the  growth  of  output  per  worker  per  annum.  In  the  words,  the  growth 
deceleration appears to be a simple reflection of a major reversal in productivity growth. 
 
The information per decades is also shown in Table 3. Output per worker grew at an 
annual rate of 1.3 percent in the late 1950s and the 1960s, and then accelerated to 1.9 
percent during the 1970s. It then fell to 0.6 percent during the 1980s and 1.1 percent 
during the 1990s.  
 
                                                 
10 These results remain unchanged under the alternative measurement of the returns of education. The same 
occurs when α= 0.2 and α=0.4 are used. 
11 The Bai-Perron test finds a downbreak in of TFP growth in 1974 (robust to the choice of h).   10 
As mentioned, the contribution of human capital accumulation to economic growth has 
been relatively stable, reflecting the relatively stable progress in educational attainment 
(or, at least, reflecting the parsimony of the years of schooling data). There is, however, 
an interesting difference in the role of productivity when comparing the 1980s with the 
1990s. The 1980s emerge as a period of negative productivity growth and low physical 
capital  deepening  (incidentally,  the  two  factors  often  mentioned  in  the  literature  as 
justifying the structural reforms of the early 1990s). In contrast, during the 1990s, capital 
intensity increased (as a consequence of the investment boom that resulted from trade 
liberalization,  capital  inflows,  and  currency  appreciation),  while  productivity  growth 
collapsed even more during this period. 
 
 
5. EXPLAINING THE GROWTH AND PRODUCTIVITY IMPLOSION  
 
It is extremely difficult to point towards changes in the political system or in economic 
policies in order to explain the deceleration in economic growth since 1980. On the one 
hand, most legal and constitutional reforms occurred in the early 1990s, almost ten years 
after the decline in growth. Although the economy experienced a negative external shock 
during the early 1980s, mainly due to the end of the coffee boom of the late 1970s and 
the beginning of the debt crisis, it is hard to argue that this sole factor could explain such 
a long-lasting deceleration in growth. Not only coffee has become much less relevant for 
the economy but also it is a well-established fact that the debt crisis was not as severe for 
Colombia as for other highly-indebted nations. Therefore, it is necessary to look into 
other areas in order to find the explanation for the productivity implosion. 
 
The  emergence  of  Colombia  as  a  major  illicit  drug  producer  is  perhaps  the  most 
prominent aspect of the country’s recent economic and political history. According to 
data  from  the  United  Nations  (www.unodc.org)  cocaine  production,  which  was 
practically inexistent in 1980, grew to 90 tons in 1990 and then rose to 700 tons in 2000. 
The area under cultivation of illicit crops increased to nearly 140,000 hectares in 2000, 
from  less  than  20,000  in  1980.  The  standard  argument  is  that  coca  production  in 
Colombia substituted imports of coca paste from Bolivia and Peru. Between 1980 and 
2000, Colombia became the largest cocaine producer in the world, arguably controlling 
80% of the supply
12.   
 
The expansion in drug-trafficking activities can be linked to the collapse of productivity, 
mainly through the effect of drug-trafficking on crime and violence. The homicide rate 
(homicides per 100,000 population) increased to 62 on average during the 1990s, from 41 
                                                 
12 Estimations of the proceeds from the drug trade are highly speculative. Some conservative measures (see 
Steiner (1997) and Rocha (2000)) put a low boundary in the US$2-3 billion per year range (around 3% of 
GDP). However, apart from the concerns on the quality of area and production data, the issue of which 
price  to  use  is  highly  controversial.  According  to  Miron  (2001),  in  1998  the  price  of  the  coca  leave 
necessary to produce one gram of pure cocaine was between US$0.36-$0.57. The price of one gram of 
cocaine  in  the  Colombian  wholesale  market  was  US$1.50-$2.00,  and  US$12.00-$18.00  in  the  U.S. 
wholesale market. The price paid by the final consumer was US$122.00. This means that the price was 
multiplied 73 times between Colombia and the streets of the U.S. In the case of coffee, this factor ranges 
between 29 and 34 times.   11 
during the 1980s, 23 during the 1970s, and 19 during the 1960s. A similar patter can be 
observed fro kidnapping rates. The increase in the homicide rate, in turn, is related to the 
increase in the activities of insurgent and paramilitary groups.  
 
Figures  7a  and  7b  plot  the  area  under  coca  cultivation,  as  well  as  homicide  and 
kidnapping rates
13. The strong relationship between these variables has been the subject 
of a number of studies that argue that the extraction of rents from primary goods (such as 
oil and coca) has strengthened the military capacity of the insurgent groups. One example 
is Collier (2000), who points that: 
  
“… economic characteristics – dependence on primary commodity exports, low 
average incomes, slow growth, and large diasporas – are all significant and 
powerful predictors of civil war. Rebellions either have the objective of natural 
resource predation, or are critically dependent upon natural resource predation in 
order to pursue other objectives..” 
 
In the Colombian context, the predatory behavior of the insurgent groups in their regions 
of influence has been documented Rangel (2000). Virtually no one, including the rebels, 
questions the fact that the expansion of the insurgent groups during the 1980s and 1990s 
–both in terms of their ability to recruit and the sophistication of their arms- was based on 
the extraction of rents from the growing cocaine business
14.  
 
The relationship between drug-trafficking and overall criminality has been analyzed by 
Gaviria (2000). He argues that expansion of drug-trafficking activities not only had a 
direct impact on crime but also indirectly through the effect on the congestion of the 
judicial system and the consequent reduction in the probability of punishment. Also, the 
change in moral values and the diffusion of crime technologies had a negative effect on 
overall delinquency.  
 
Social capital or social infrastructure is, arguably, the main channel linking crime and 
violence,  on  the  one  hand,  and  productivity  on  the  other
15.  Lederman,  Loayza,  and 
Menéndez  (2001)  have  provided  empirical  evidence  showing  a  strong  negative 
relationship between violent crime and social capital which they define as “...The set of 
rules,  norms,  obligations,  reciprocity,  and  trust  embedded  in  social  relations,  social 
structures, and society’s institutional arrangements which enables its members to achieve 
their individual and community objectives...” As they point out, the relationship between 
social capital and crime may run in both directions. The incidence of violent crime may 
diminish  social  capital,  such  as  trust,  or  may  increase  it,  through  the  formation  of 
                                                 
13 Data on illicit crop cultivation come from Arango et al. (2004) for the period 1976-2003 and from the  
Sistema Integrado  de  Monitoreo  de  Cultivos  Ilícitos  (SIMCI, 2006) for 2004-2005. Data on Homicide 
comes from Reportes de Criminalidad (Policia Nacional, DIJIN, Various Issues). Kidnappings come from 
statistics of the Departamento Nacional de Planeación based on Ministerio de Defensa and Fondelibertad. 
Population data was taken from Flórez (2000) and DANE (after 2000). 
14 In their public statements, FARC-EP (the largest rebel organization) justifies the extraction of rents as a 
tax levied on the small coca growers in exchange for protection. 
15 The term social infrastructure is more precise because it refers to elements that are not really factors of 
production.   12 
community  organizations  to  fight  crime
16.  However,  the  evidence  suggests  that  the 
erosion of social capital is the dominant factor. 
 
The relationship between productivity and social capital or social infrastructure has been 
a recurrent theme in the recent growth literature. In an influential paper, Hall and Jones 
(1999) argue that the lack of social infrastructure encourages predatory behavior. Under 
these circumstances a fraction of the population is employed in unproductive activities, 
either by engaging in crime-related activities or by protecting their human and physical 
assets, making no contribution to output. In addition, some of the physical capital can 
diverted to unproductive activities. Defense equipment is perhaps the best example. This 
form of diversion is captured in the productivity component of the sources-of-growth 
accounting. Similarly, the productivity term captures the contribution of other factors of 
production (e.g., land) that may become unusable when it is too costly to protect them.   
 
From a different angle, social capital, or ‘trust’, decreases the costs of social transactions, 
such as the costs of negotiations, enforcement, etc. In the words of Robison and Siles, as 
quoted by Loayza et al. (2001) “…transaction costs are reduced by increases in social 
capital because each party to the trade has his well-being linked to the well-being of his 
or her trading partner” (1997, 5).   
 
In sum, there are multiple channels through which and increase in crime can cause output 
and productivity losses. We now turn to the evidence in favor of the argument that the 
expansion  of  drug-trafficking  activities  was  the  main  factor  behind  the  exponential 
increase in crime rates, and that, in turn, worsened security conditions had a negative 





This  section  presents  some  basic  evidence  that  supports  the  main  hypotheses  of  this 
paper. We start by reporting the cross correlations between drug trafficking (area under 
cultivation),  homicide  rate,  and  productivity  (all  in  growth  rates).  These  correlations 
suggest  that  contemporaneous  and  past  increases  in  the  area  under  illicit  crops  are 
associated with higher crime rates, while higher homicide rates (present and past) are 
negatively correlated with growth in total factor productivity.  
 
In particular, Figure 8a shows that present and past (up to six years before) changes in the 
area cultivated with illicit crops are positively and significantly correlated with growth in 
homicide rates. Figure 8b shows that the opposite is not necessarily true: past changes in 
the homicide rate do not seem to be significantly correlated with growth in illicit crops. 
 
                                                 
16 Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer (1999) examine the relationship between social capital and homicide in 
the U.S., while Moser and Holland (1997) and Moser and Shrader (1998) analyze this issue with data for 
Latin America and  conclude  that “[t]here are often higher levels of participation in  community action 
groups in less violent areas”.   13 
Regarding the relationship between TFP and homicides, Figure 8c shows a negative (and 
significant) correlation between present and past changes (up to 12 years before) in the 
homicide rates and contemporaneous TFP growth. Again, the opposite is not true: past 
changes in TFP do not seem to bear any relationship with the contemporaneous crime 
rates (Figure 8d). 
 
Finally, there is a negative correlation between past changes in the area under illicit crops 
(up to two years before) and contemporaneous changes in TFP (Figure 8e). However, 
past changes in TFP do not seem to be significantly correlated with current growth in 
illicit crops (Figure 8f).   
 
 
Time series estimations 
 
VEC  and  VAR  models  provide  a  more  precise  estimation  of  the  causal  relationship 
between the three variables of interest: Area under illicit crops, homicide rates and TFP. 
Although the three variables should ideally be included in the same model, in practice 
this  is  not  possible  given  the  limited  number  of  observations.  In  fact,  the  variable 
measuring the area under illicit crops is available only since 1975, severely reducing the 
degrees of freedom in a model with three equations. Therefore, we estimated a VAR 
model  for  each  one  of  the  three  pairs  of  variables,  rather  than  including  the  three 
variables jointly. The estimated impulse-response functions are shown in Figure 9. 
 
All models shown in this section use first differences in logs of the variables of interest, 
given that they are all integrated of order one, I(1), in levels (see Appendix 1). Also, the 
null hypothesis of cointegration between these variables can be rejected. Once stationary 
variables were obtained, we used the minimum number of lags -in each VAR model- that 
allows the errors to be normal while not exhibiting multivariate autocorrelations. 
 
The first VAR(1) model uses first differences of the logs of area under illicit crops and 
TFP: 
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Figure  9a  shows  that  a  positive  shock  in  the  growth  of  the  area  with  illicit  crops  is 
associated with a permanent reduction in the growth of TFP. Also, the null hypothesis 
that changes in the log of Area do not Granger cause changes in the log of TFP can be 
rejected (see Appendix 2). Conversely, changes in TFP are not associated with significant 
changes in Area, and the corresponding hypothesis that TFP growth does not cause Area 
growth cannot be rejected (Figure 9b).   
 
Turning  to  the relation  between  Area  and  Homicides  we  estimate  a  VAR  (5)  of  the 
following form:  
   14 
1 1 111 112
211 212 2 1
5 3 151 152
251 252 5 4
( ) ( )
...
(   ) (   )
( )
...





Ln Area Ln Area C
Ln Homicide Rate C Ln Homicide Rate
Ln Area
Ln Homicide Rate
   
   
     





                   
= + +                                    
             
+ +                         
 
 
Figure 9c shows that positive shocks to changes in the log of Area cause permanent 
increases  in  changes  in  the  log  of  the  Homicide  Rate.  The  corresponding  Granger 
causality supports this interpretation (Appendix 2). Shocks to homicide rate do not seem 
to have an effect on Area (Figure 9d).  
 
Finally, the relationship between Homicides and TFP is estimated with a VAR(12) of the 
following form:   
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The results suggest that positive shocks to the change in the log of the homicide rate 
generate  reductions  in  TFP  growth  (Figure  9e),  while  increases  in  TFP  growth  are 
associated with reductions in the growth of the Homicide Rate (Figure 9f). However, 
Granger causality tests indicate that causality runs from homicides to TFP, rather than the 
opposite (Appendix 2).  
 
In sum, the evidence presented in this section strongly supports the view that the increase 
in the area under illicit crops was, to a large extent, an exogenous event which had very 
adverse consequences for Colombia. Challenging the conventional wisdom, which often 
sees drug trafficking activities as a consequence of insecurity and low growth, we argue 
just the opposite. Here, the increase in crime and the subsequent reduction in productivity 
are  the  result  of  a  sudden  increase  in  the  production  of  illicit  crops.  This  result  has 
important policy implications because it suggests that a reduction in drug production can 
have a large economic dividend.   
 
 
6. SOCIAL CONFLICT AND GROWTH: CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE 
 
The time series evidence shown in the previous section can be complemented with an 
analysis of the relationship between crime and growth using data from a large sample of 
countries. We do this in two steps. First, we look at the long-term relationship between 
homicides and per capita GDP for a large sample of countries. This evidence shows that 
countries with higher homicide rates tend to have lower incomes, even after controlling 
for potential endogeneity. Second, we look at a panel of countries and estimate a growth   15 
model using data from the 1960s to 1990s. We do this with purpose of identifying the key 
variables that explain Colombia’s growth deceleration since 1980.  
 
 
Long-run relationship between crime and income 
 
Although there is a debate on the specific mechanisms and their interaction, physical 
geography  and  institutions  seem  to  be  the  two  key  determinants  of  the  long–run 
performance  of  individual  economies.  According  to  the  geography-driven  models  of 
growth, the prevalence of tropical conditions acts as a constraint to growth. The main 
reason is that technologies are ecologically-specific and that the technologies developed 
for  the  temperate  zones  are  more  productive.  Also,  technological  innovation  is  an 
increasing returns activity, so the technological gap between tropical and temperate zones 
has widened (see Sachs, 2001).  
 
Institutions  have  received  a  great  deal  of  attention  in  the  recent  empirical  growth 
literature.  A  number  of  papers  show  that  property  rights,  appropriate  regulatory 
structures,  quality  and  independence  of  the  judiciary,  and  bureaucratic  capacity  are 
essential pre-conditions and determinants of growth. For instance, Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson (2001 and 2002) and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) argue that 
weak  institutions,  but  not  physical  geography,  explain  variations  in  economic 
development across former colonies.
17  
 
Most of this literature takes as a starting point the estimation of ‘benchmark’ regression 
of the cross-country determinants of economic development of the following form: 
 
t t t t gdp         + + + = Geography Quality nal Institutio ln 2 1 0  
 
The dependent variable is the natural log of real GNP per capita at purchasing parity in 
1995  US  dollars,  LGNP95,  as  taken  from  the  World  Bank’s  World  Development 
Indicators.  
 
A frequent proxy for institutions is the risk of confiscation and forced nationalization of 
property, EXPROP, obtained from Political Risk Services
18. Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2001) have noted that EXPROP is likely to be endogenous because high-
income countries may be better able to protect property rights than poor countries. They 
use a measure of mortality rates from the early 19
th century in logs, LMORT, as an 
instrument  for  EXPROP,  although  the  sample  of  countries  is  severely  reduced  when 
LMORT is used. 
                                                 
17 These variables are highly interrelated. Tropical countries have relied on extractive activities that have 
resulted in rent-distributive institutions (in Colonial times and now), rather than institutions that promote 
local industry (see Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997). The question is whether geography has a direct impact 
on long term growth, for reasons different than its impact on institutions. 
18 The average value for Colombia over the period 1985-1995 (obtained from Sachs and McArthur, 2001) 
measured on a 1 to 10 scale (higher values imply lower expropriation risk) is 7.39, compared to a sample 
mean of 7.02. This implies that 46 countries (out of 118) have a lower risk of confiscation than Colombia.   16 
 
Infant  Mortality  Rates  in  1995  (deaths  per  1000  live  births;  taken  from  the  United 
Nations),  IMR95,  has  been  a  frequent  geographically-related  variable  used  in  the 
estimations
19. Of course, joint endogeneity between health indicators and income also 
seems plausible. McArthur and Sachs (2001) have shown that cross-country differences 
in health are affected by physical geography (mainly because of disease incidence in 
tropical  ecozones).  Therefore,  IMR95  can  be  instrumented  using  the  mean  annual 
temperature in Celsius, MEANTEMP; the portion of land area within 100 km of the sea 
coast, LT100KM (both from Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger, 1999); and the absolute value 
of latitude, LATABS (from La Porta et al., 1999)
20.  
 
Equations 1 and 2 in Table 4 replicate McArthur and Sachs (2001) and reiterate the point 
that EXPROP and IMR95 are powerful explanatory variables. The coefficients are highly 
significant  and  the  R-squared  is  high  (0.8).  In  the  specific  case  of  Colombia,  the 
regressions predict a value for per capita GNP in 1995 which is between 1% and 4% 
below the observed level. This implies that the level of GNP in Colombia is quite in line 
with the value that corresponds to a country with that level of political institutions (as 
measured by EXPROP), health, and geography.  
 
However, it is clear that the risk of confiscation and forced nationalization of property 
does  not  capture  the  essence  of  Colombia’s  institutional  problems.  As  argued  in  the 
previous  section,  the  Homicide  Rate  is  perhaps  a  better  measure.  For  this  reason, 
Equations 3 and 4 in Table 4 add the homicide rate in 1995 to the list of explanatory 
variables
21. In Equation 3, the coefficient on HOMICIDES95 comes out with a negative 
sign but insignificantly different from zero. In Equation 4, which excludes EXPROP, the 
effect  of  HOMICIDES95  is  negative  and  significant.  Figure  10  shows  the  partial 
correlation between the log of per capita GDP in 1995 and the homicide rate (controlling 
for the effect of infant mortality). Clearly, there is a negative correlation between income 
and crime. 
 
Interestingly, Equation 4 does poorly in predicting Colombia’s GDP. In fact, based on 
this simplified model, the 1995 levels of criminality and infant mortality would predict, 
in the steady state, a level of income between 41% and 57% below the level observed in 
that year. In other words, Colombia’s level of income is higher than what corresponds to 
a country with such a high level of criminality.  
 
One possible interpretation of this result is that the quality of institutions (in this case the 
homicide rate) in a given time period will affect the growth rate of the economy during 
                                                 
19 The value for Colombia is 30, compared to a world average of 48. 
20 Colombia’s average temperature is 22.5° (Celsius). The absolute degree of latitude is 0.04°, indicating 
that most of the territory is tropical in an ecological sense. Only 16% of the land is within 100 km from the 
seacoast, making Colombia one of the most landlocked countries of the world (139 out of 150 countries 
have a higher proportion of the territory close to the seacoast). 
21 The homicide rate comes from the U.N. Demographic Yearbooks and shows that Colombia had the 
highest homicide rate (80 per 100,000 inhabitants) among a group of 84 countries in 1995. In 1985 the rate 
was much lower (37.4 per 100,000 pop.), but even then there was only one country (out of 66) with a 
higher rate.   17 
that period, and not the contemporaneous level of income. In other words, the correct 
specification should use the growth rate during a time interval as the dependent variable. 
This structure is more appealing for the issue at hand, given that high criminality is a 
relatively recent phenomenon so it may have had on growth rates, but not yet on the per 
capita level of income. However, the regressions in levels are of interest because they 
suggest that if crime is not reduced, the level of income will fall in the long run (steady 
state) to a level consistent with the predictions of the model.  
 
 
Explaining the growth deceleration in a panel of countries 
 
Given that our goal is to explain changes in growth rates across time periods (i.e. why 
Colombia’s growth decelerated in the 1980s and 1990s, relative to the 1960s and 1970s) 
and across countries (why Colombia’s growth decelerated during the 1990s, relative to 
the  region)  we  should  use  country  panel  data  on  growth  performance  and  its 
determinants.  
In  this  section,  following  the  work  of  Loayza,  Fajnzylber,  and  Calderon  (2005)  we 
estimate  the  determinants  of  per  capita  GDP  growth  in  an  unbalanced  panel  of  65 
countries where each observation corresponds to a 10-year average (for the years 1971-
80, 1981-90, and 1991-99) In total, there are 175 observations. The estimated equation 
has the following form: 
 
0 0 1 2 3 ln iT iT iT iT T i y y gap X     µ       = + + + + â  
 
where  iT y    is growth rate of output per capita in country  i during decade T. The right 
hand side variables include the level of per capita income at the beginning of the decade, 
0 ln iT y   (to  capture  transitional  convergence),  the  output  gap  (also  at  the  start  of  the 
decade) based on the Baxter-King filter, 
0 iT gap , a set of explanatory variables ( iT X ), a 
decade-specific  effect  ( T µ ),  and  unobserved  country  specific  factors  ( i   )  which  are 
potentially correlated with the explanatory variables. 
 
The inclusion of the output gap as an explanatory variable controls for movements in 
cyclical  output  and,  thus,  differentiates  between  transitional  convergence  and  cyclical 
reversion. The decade-specific effect controls for changes in external conditions that affect 
all countries alike (i.e. the debt crisis of the 1980s).  
 
Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderon (2005) use two types of explanatory variables ( iT X ).
22 
The first class includes variables that measure external shocks and the quality of macro 
                                                 
22 See their book for a complete description of the variables, including data sources and a literature review 
of the studies that have used similar variables.   18 
policies. These are variables that are more likely to explain changes in growth performance 
in one country across time: 
 
Shocks to the terms of trade: Measured as the log difference of the terms of 
trade, measured in the customary way.  
 
Lack  of  price  stability:  Measured  by  the  average  inflation  rate  for  the 
corresponding country and decade.  
 
Cyclical volatility of GDP: Measured by the standard deviation of the output 
gap for the corresponding country and decade.  
 
External imbalances and the risk of balance-of-payments crises: Measured 
by an index of real exchange rate overvaluation.  
 
Systemic  banking  crises  Measured  by  the  fraction  of  years  that  a  country 
undergoes a systemic banking crisis in the corresponding period, as identified in 
Caprio and Klingebiel (1999). 
 
The second class, and the one of interest from the viewpoint of this paper, includes the 
more structural variables that have been identified in the empirical cross section growth 
literature as powerful determinants of growth (more often across countries than across 
time). The variables used in their specification are:  
 
Education: Measured as the rate of gross secondary-school enrollment. 
Financial depth: Measured by the ratio of private domestic credit supplied by 
private financial institutions to GDP. 
International trade openness: Measured by the volume of trade (real exports 
plus  imports)  over  GDP,  adjusted  for  the  size  (area  and  population)  of  the 
country, for whether it is landlocked, and for whether it is an oil exporter
23.  
Government  burden:  Measured  by  the  ratio  of  government  consumption  to 
GDP.  
Public services and infrastructure: Measured by the number of main telephone 
lines per capita. 
 
Governance is the final element in the list of structural variables. This is a wide area that 
covers aspects such as the institutional quality of government, including the respect for 
civil and political rights, bureaucratic efficiency, absence of corruption, enforcement of 
contractual  agreements,  and  prevalence  of  law  and  order.  Evidently,  there  are  many 
variables related to the concept of governance, and choosing one is somewhat an arbitrary 
decision. Writing on the uses and abuses of these indicators, Arndt and Oman (2006) 
                                                 
23 This is a standard procedure that uses the fitted values of a regression of trade volume on those variables.    19 
show that the most widely used are composite perceptions-based indicators. They argue 
that  even  the  most  carefully  constructed  of  these  indicators  lack  transparency  and 
comparability over time, and suffer from selection bias.  
 
Loayza,  Fajnzylber,  and  Calderon  (2005)  use  the  first  principal  component  of  four 
indicators reported by Political Risk Services in their publication International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG). These are the indicators on the prevalence of law and order, quality 
of the bureaucracy, absence of corruption, and accountability of public officials. All of 
them enter with almost identical weights in their first principal component. 
 
Although the perfect governance indicator does not exist, we prefer to use the homicide 
rates for three reasons. First, the measure chosen by Loayza et al. (2005) does not come 
out  significant  in all of  their estimations. Second,  homicide rates  have  some  variation 
between decades which would be useful to exploit. Third, from the discussion of the 
previous sections we know that the increase in homicides rates has a potentially relevant 
role in explaining Colombia’s growth deceleration.   
 
Data on homicides come from the United Nations World Surveys on Crime Trends and 
Criminal Justice Systems
24. These surveys have been implemented every five years since 
1970 in 157 countries. Crime variables include counts of recorded crime for homicide, 
assault,  rape,  robbery,  theft,  burglary,  fraud,  embezzlement,  drug  trafficking,  drug 
possession,  bribery,  and  corruption.  There  are  also  counts  of  suspects,  persons 
prosecuted,  persons  convicted, and  prison  admissions  by  crime, gender, and adult  or 
juvenile status
25. The countries participating in the survey and the variables available vary 
by  year.  To  maximize  the  number  of  observations  we  use  information  on  average 
homicide  rates  during  the  decade
26.  Figure  11  shows  the  data,  which  suggests  that 




Table 5 shows the results of an OLS pooled regression. Equation 1 replicates the original 
estimation of Loayza et al. (2005), while equation 2 uses the homicide rate instead of 
their  measure  of  governance.  The  estimated  coefficient  is  not  only  negative  and 
significant, but also quantitatively very large: An increment of 1% in homicide rates is 
associated with a 0.3 percentage points reduction in per capita GDP growth. Finally, 
Table  6  shows  the  observed  per  capita  growth  rates  for  Colombia,  the  fitted  values 
predicted by the model, and the corresponding error of the regression. Interestingly, the 
model  predicts  the  deceleration  of  the  1990s,  contrary  to  the  original  estimation  in 
                                                 
24 See Burnham and Burnham (1999) for a complete description of the data. 
25 Other variables include the population of the country and largest city; budgets and salaries for police, 
courts, and prisons; and types of sanctions, including imprisonment, corporal punishment, deprivation of 
liberty, control of freedom, warning, fine, and community sentence. 
26 This gives more observations than measuring homicide rates at the beginning of the decade.   20 
Loayza et al. (2005). This implies that the inclusion of the homicide rate is a key factor 





Colombia’s GDP has been growing at an average rate of 3% per year since 1980, which 
represents a slowdown of 2 percentage points per year relative to the period between 
1950 and 1979. This paper analyzes the possible causes of such a prolonged deceleration 
in growth, which has had devastating consequences on welfare.  
 
The paper looks at this issue in three steps. First, it deals with the proximate causes of 
growth  –the  standard  sources-of-growth-decomposition-  and  concludes  that  the 
deceleration of growth is the result of an implosion of productivity. This is interesting 
because it implies that both physical and human capital accumulation were not the cause 
of the reduction in growth. Indeed, this reduction is explained entirely by changes in 
productivity growth. Prior to 1980, productivity gains added 1 percentage point to the 
per-capita GDP growth on average per year. Since 1980, productivity losses have been 
subtracting a similar amount. 
 
In the second step, the paper deals with the determinants of productivity using the time 
series evidence. The conclusion is that the implosion of productivity is directly related to 
the four-fold increase in criminality. The existing literature has already shown that the 
explosion of crime was the result of the rapid expansion of drug-trafficking activities and 
the intensification of the internal armed conflict (fueled by the rents from the drug trade). 
Thus, the paper argues that it is not a coincidence that the implosion of productivity, the 
increase  in  crime,  the  expansion  of  drug-trafficking,  and  the  strengthening  of  the 
insurgent movements, occurred at the same time, starting around 1980. However, the 
evidence suggests the presence of causal relation from drugs to crime, and from crime to 
productivity. This is of interest because it supports the idea that reducing drug rents has a 
large economic dividend.  
 
The third step focuses on the cross-country evidence. Countries with high homicide rates 
grow less and have lower per capita incomes. Moreover, Colombia’s growth deceleration 
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Table 1 
 
Results of the Bai-Perron Test  
(Presence of structural breaks in GDP growth) 
 
Series: Colombia GDP growth, 1951 to 2005
z t ={1} h=13 m =2 T=55
supF(1) supF(2) UDmax  WDmax 





 1  2 T1
5.1747 3.1879 1979
(0.3532) (0.3730)
* Significant at 10% level.
Source: Author's calculations.
1/ For all tests and calculations of standard errors, a
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix
using a quadratic kernel with automatic bandwidth selection based on
an AR(1) approximation is used. Residuals are pre-whitened using a
VAR(1). See Bai and Perron (2003a).
Specifications
Tests 1/
Number of breaks selected
Parameter estimates with one break





Returns to Education 
(based on the estimation of the Mincer equation) 
 
Years of schooling Total Men Women
0-4 0.0853 0.0763 0.0830
5 0.1214 0.1029 0.1576
6-10 0.0761 0.0618 0.1021
11 0.1369 0.1018 0.1595
12-15 0.1201 0.1238 0.1127
16+ 0.2158 0.2320 0.2026
Average 0.1020 0.0923 0.1152
Source: Nuñez and Sánchez (2000).  
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Table 3 
Sources of Growth Decomposition 
 









1955-1979 1.55% -0.25% 0.74% 1.05%
1980-2005 0.80% 0.47% 0.92% -0.60%
1955-1959 1.31% 0.31% 0.26% 0.72%
1970-1979 1.91% -0.34% 1.02% 1.23%
1980-1989 0.63% 0.38% 1.08% -0.84%
1990-1999 1.13% 1.00% 0.80% -0.68%
2000-2005 0.53% -0.28% 0.87% -0.06%
Source: Author's calculations.  
 
Table 4 
Institutions, crime and geography 
Regression Results 
REGRESSION 1 2 3 4
Dependent Variable LGNP95 LGNP95 LGNP95 LGNP95
Estimation IV IV IV IV
CONSTANT 7.67 5.24 7.74 9.99
t-stat 10.54 4.14 10.22 103.8
EXPROP 0.22 0.52 0.23
t-stat 2.95 3.45 3.09
IMR95 -0.02 -0.012 -0.03 -0.04





N 118 63 49 50
Ad R-sq 0.76 0.79 0.85 0.80
Residual for Colombia 0.0439 0.011 0.41 0.57
Instruments:
MEANTEMP        
LT100KM        
LATABS        
LMORT  





Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita, by decade: 1971-1999
(t-statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Initial GDP per capita -0.023 -0.025
(in logs) (-4.290) (-4.780)
Initial Output Gap -0.052 -0.068
(log[Actual GDP/potential GDP]) (-0.720) (-0.950)
Education 0.014 0.015
(secondary enrollment, in logs) (2.910) (3.220)
Financial Depth 0.001 0.001
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (0.390) (0.420)
Trade Openness 0.010 0.009
(structure adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs) (2.420) (2.060)
Government Burden -0.013 -0.009
(Government consumption/GDP, in logs) (-2.210) (-1.460)
Public Infrastructure 0.012 0.011
(Main telephone lines per capita, in logs) (3.800) (3.550)
Governance -0.001
(1st principal component of ICRG indicator) (-0.570)
Lack of Price Stability -0.015 -0.014
(Inflation rate, in log[100+inf. Rate]) (-2.830) (-2.790)
Cyclical Volatility -0.058 -0.038
(Std. Dev. Of output gap) (-0.410) (-0.290)
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation -0.011 -0.013
(in logs; index is proportional, overvaluation if > 100) (-2.200) (-2.700)
Systemic Banking Crises 0.000 0.001
(Frequency of years under crisis: 0-1) (0.000) (0.130)
Terms of Trade Shocks 0.128 0.123
(Growth rate of Terms of Trade) (2.590) (2.550)
Homicide Rate per 100.000 inhabitants -0.003
(in logs) (-2.140)
Number of observations: 123 123
R-squared 0.479 0.499
Source: Author's calculations.


















Table 6  
 
Variable of interest: Change in the growth rate of GDP per capita
Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 1 Eq. 2
1980s vs. 1970s -1.78% -2.92% -1.54% 1.14% -0.24%
1990s vs. 1980s -0.55% 2.11% -0.30% -2.66% -0.25%
Source: Loayza et al (2002) and Author's calculations.
Decade
Error Estimated change
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Source: Author's calculations based on National Accounts data from DANE.
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Figure 2 
Structural Break 
Note: Minimum period between structural breaks was set to  h= 13 years.
Source: Author's calculations based on National Accounts from DANE.

























































































































Source: Estadísticas históricas de Colombia, Cuadro 7.3 (1954-1996) and calculations from DNP-DDS for the period 1997-2000.
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Figure 6 
 
Source: Author's calculations based on National Accounts from DANE.
Notes: 
TFP was computed asumming an alpha equal to 0.3, minimum period between breaks was set to  h= 13 years.



















































































































Source: Policia Nacional, Ministerio de Defensa, Arango et al (2004) and SIMCI.
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Figure 7b 
Source: Policia Nacional, Ministerio de Defensa, Arango et al (2004) and SIMCI.































































Kidnapping rate Area under coca cultivation (right scale)
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Figure 8 
Partial Correlations 
All variables expressed in percentage growth  
Source: Author’s calculations.
Confidence Interval at 90%.
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Figure 9   
Impulse-response functions 
Source: Author’s calculations.
Confidence Interval at 90% using 10.000 bootstrap replications.
Orthogonal Impulse Response Function using Cholesky decomposition.
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Appendix 1  









log(Area) Constant -2.92 -2.97 I(1) 0.574 0.463 I(1)  1976-2005
log(TFP) Constant -2.75 -2.92 I(1) 0.351 0.463 I(0)* 1955-2005
log(Homicide Rate) Constant -1.23 -2.92 I(1) 0.757 0.463 I(1)  1958-2005
*I(1) at 10%.
Source: Author's calculations  
 
Appendix 2 
Granger Causality Test 
Variable Lags in VAR Null hypothesis Result at 5% P value F test
Growth in Homicide Rate Cultivated Area does not granger causes Homicide Rate Reject null 0.0078
Growth in Cultivated Area Homicide Rate does not granger causes Cultivated Area Don't reject null 0.8820
Growth in Homicide Rate Productivity does not granger causes Homicide Rate Don't reject null 0.5207
Growth in Productivity Homicide Rate does not granger causes Productivity Reject null 0.0011
Growth in Cultivated Area Cultivated Area does not granger causes Productivity Reject null 0.0466
Growht in Productivity Productivity does not granger causes Cultivated Area Don't reject null 0.4182
Source: Author's calculations.
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